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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Western Assumptions of the Goodness of the Rule of Law
When the West advises other countries on nation-building, it frequently
signals the importance of the "rule of law" in the developing country's
emerging political structure.! Contemporary and historical examples abound.
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The concept of the "rule of law" has been the focus of much scholarly attention.
See generally RuT G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE IN
TRANSITION: CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES SINCE 1989 (Jiri Priban et al. eds., 2003);
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Multinational corporations, national and international security experts, and
human rights advocates all promote the rule of law.2 American lawyers'
fascination with the rule of law is illustrated in recent publications of the
International Law and Practice Section of the American Bar Association. In a
special issue on the topic, there is a roll-call review on developments on the
rule of law in various countries, including Iraq, Uzbekistan, and Belarus.3 In
another issue, Chinese policymakers are instructed on what China needs to
do to conform to rule of law requirements of the World Trade Organization.4
JEAN ALLAIN, A CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE RULE OF LAW AND ITS
LIMITS (2000); William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 723; Margaret
Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781-819 (1989). For
our purposes here, I begin with the common understanding that a country with a rule of
law is one with a formal legal system (statutes, codes, and cases) in major subject areas
such as property, commercial transactions, and criminal law. I acknowledge, however,
that there are varied definitions including those that require certain elements or values.
More recently, the rule of law in China also has been a topic of increasing scholarly
attention. See generally THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et
al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter TURNER]; Lan Cao, Symposium, The "Rule of Law" in China,
11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 539 (2003); Norman Kutcher, To Speak the Unspeakable:
AIDS, Culture, and the Rule of Law in China, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 271
(2003); Shanan L. Guinn, China and the Rule of Law: All Is Not Lost However, All is
Not Gained (2004) (unpublished student paper draft, on file with the author).
2 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of
Law", 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2276-80 (2003) (describing an explosion in rule of law
promotion by these groups, particularly post-September 11, 2001).
3 Phillip James Walker, Rule of Law: Iraq, Failed States, and the Law of
Occu4pation
, 
INT'L L. NEWS, Winter 2004, at 1, 8-10.
Rule of Law Issues in China's Accession to the WTO, INT'L L. NEWS, Winter 2003,
at 4. In very directive language, the leadership of the China Law Committee of the
Section indicated several goals that China should have regarding its development of the
rule of law:
(1) an autonomous legal and judicial infrastructure;
(2) increases in the quality and quantity of China's law schools and lawyers;
(3) improved regulatory transparency via fair notice and hearing, public
promulgation of legislation, and availability of legal information;
(4) observance of legal mechanisms respecting human rights;
(5) an improved legal culture;
(6) regularity in the legal process, uniform application of rules, and principled
appellate review and oversight;
(7) removal of links between local courts and local government, and the
creation of top-down management of courts, from the Supreme People's
Court down;
(8) tightening of time gaps between promulgation of law and release of
regulations; and
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Western governments also advocate the rule of law. President Clinton and his
administration, for instance, announced a "China Rule of Law Initiative" in
1997-1998. 5 Currently, President Bush and his administration repeatedly call
for a rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The West's implicit cultural assumption is that the rule of law is an
inherently positive goal.6 This conclusion is based on an interrelated string of
inferences. The rule of law is supposed to bring order and predictability to
how a country functions. This order and predictability means that
government and business operations are more transparent. Transparency
promotes commerce in general, including foreign trade transactions and
investment, which in the aggregate contributes to overall economic
development. In addition, the West assumes that the rule of law is a predicate
for the basic protection of human and civil rights. Given all of these positive
associations, it is not surprising that the West sees the rule of law as "good"
and a critical part of the infrastructure of emerging and transitioning
countries.7
By default, the West's implicit cultural assumption is that the absence of
the rule of law is negative and inherently undesirable. This default situation
is often considered synonymous with a society governed by the "rule of
(9) restriction of legislative drafting to legislatures, not administrative
departments.
Id. at 4.
5 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and
Prospects of U.S. Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform Projects in the People's Republic of
China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 68-72 (2000) (citing numerous government
announcements by the President and Secretary of State Madeline Albright that describe
political and substantive goals of this Initiative).
6 This Western endorsement of the rule of law has historic roots. It can be traced to
the philosopher Aristotle who argued that "law must be granted greater authority than the
will of any individual." Karen G. Turner, Introduction: The Problem of Paradigms, in
TURNER, supra note 1, at 5. See also ALLAIN, supra note 1, at 3-6; see generally DAVID
VANDRUNEN, LAW & CUSTOM: THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE FUTURE OF
THE COMMON LAW (2003).
7 The validity of these positive associations has generally not been tested. An
exception is an empirical study of Hong Kong legal events and the stock market by Emily
Johnson Barton, Pricing Judicial Independence: An Empirical Study of Post-1997 Court
of Final Appeal Decisions in Hong Kong, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361 (2002). She explores
the "Rule of Law Hypothesis" that "the establishment of the rule of law in the short term
may be a central factor in yielding long-term benefits such as economic growth and
stability." Id. at 362 (footnote omitted). In particular, she finds that there is a positive
though not always consistent relationship between legal events associated with judicial
independence (and hence a presumed strengthening of the rule of law) and the stock
market's response. Id. at 397-403.
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people" or sometimes more narrowly termed "the rule of man." 8 In contrast
to the situation described in the prior paragraph, a country without the rule of
law is presumed to be uncertain and chaotic in its government and business
functioning. Without formal legal rules, the West believes that how society
operates is not transparent. This opaqueness in how things get done
discourages trade, including foreign investment, which in turn makes overall
economic development more difficult. 9 Instead of predictable legal rules, the
fear is that the void will be filled with unpredictable and arbitrary human
indiscretions. Furthermore, the West believes that the absence of the rule of
law makes the basic protection of human and civil rights problematic.10
B. Alternative Cultural Perspective on the Rule of Law
The Western view of the rule of law is not the only model. Alternative
cultural assumptions about the rule of law exist.'" In particular, this Article
I See Stephenson, supra note 5, at 76-77.
9 E.g., Dexter Roberts, Cheated in China?, Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1997, at 142 (raising
the possibility that foreign investment in China will shrink if the rule of law is not more
manifest). But see James V. Feinerman, The Rule of Law Imposed from Outside: China's
Foreign-Oriented Legal Regime Since 1978, in TURNER, supra note 1, at 304-05
(proposing that "over-reliance on promulgating formal law may have diverted attention
from necessary economic changes and, at the same time, created misimpressions about
the rapidity and extent of economic and legal change that has actually occurred.").
Professor Brooks questions the assumption that a rule of law necessarily brings
order, a decrease in violence and subsequent protection of human rights. Brooks, supra
note 2, at 2301. Drawing from her personal experiences working in Kosovo in 1999 and
2000, she describes the irrelevance of law in many situations:
More important.., the law struck many Kosovars as neither moral nor legitimate.
In a society in which many people (by no means all, but enough) took seriously the
idea that revenge was not only excusable put perhaps even morally required,
attempts to clamp down on ethnically motivated revenge crimes and ensure equal
treatment for Albanians and Serbs struck many as unjust: Why, after all, should the
international community permit the Serbs to escape the consequences of what many
Kosovars saw as their (collectively) evil actions? When the process for selecting law
and deciding how to reform legal institutions was so arbitrary, high-handed, and
confused, the basic criteria for legitimacy were unmet. Little wonder, then, that
efforts to create the rule of law in Kosovo have been so disappointing, in ways that
should give pause to those optimistic about the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
ld. at 2298-99 (footnote omitted).
" As described by Professor Brooks:
The rule of law is not something that exists "beyond culture" and that can somehow
be added to an existing culture by the simple expedient of creating formal structures
and rewriting constitutions and statutes. In its substantive sense, the rule of law is a
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draws on China's historical and contemporary perspective on the rule of law.
In contrast to the Western view, China historically and contemporaneously
views the rule of law with skepticism.
12
As this Article explores in Part H, China has for many years analyzed the
comparative merits of legal formalism (rule of law) and of cultural norms
(rule of people). The Chinese have traditionally framed this issue as a debate
between two schools of thought: the Legalists and the Confucians. China's
own history and its observations of the West's experience with the rule of
law further inform its perennial struggle between these two approaches.
Moreover, China's skepticism of the rule of law continues today. Part HI of
this article studies two contemporary situations: the protection (or lack of
protection) of intellectual property and disputes over the use of land. Both
situations offer a window into how the rule of law and the rule of people co-
exist and often conflict. In Part IV, the implications of the analysis in Parts II
and III are discussed. In particular, the uneasy relationship between the rule
of law and the rule of people, prompted both by China's skepticism of the
rule of law and by China's comfort with the rule of people is explored. This
Article considers the difference between the existence of formal Chinese
laws and the actual recognition and enforcement (or more accurately the lack
of recognition and enforcement) of the laws; the parallel systems of a rule of
law and a rule of people; and finally, the varied forms of the rule of law from
which China might base its economic and social order.
By studying Chinese skepticism of the rule of law, this article reflects on
whether the implicit positive associations with the rule of law are merited.
Furthermore, China is a particularly appropriate country on which to focus.
China is a developing country, located in Asia, with a socialist economic and
political system that is transitioning to a more market-oriented environment.
By studying China, therefore, one can also cautiously extrapolate some of
what is learned to other developing countries', other Asian countries', and
culture, yet the human-rights-law and foreign policy communities know very little-
and manifest little curiosity-about the complex processes by which cultures are
created and changed.
Id. at 2285 (footnote omitted).
The importance of putting legal issues in a realistic cultural context is increasingly
being recognized. See generally Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and
Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN.
L. REv. 1599 (2000) (describing the difficulty of transporting American concepts of
corporate law into China without acknowledging the function of the Chinese kinship unit
as a basis for organizing and operating businesses).
12 Turner, supra note 6, at 4-5.
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other transitioning socialist societies' perceptions of the rule of law.' 3 China
also has the world's fastest growing economy and is a leader in attracting
direct foreign investment. Many American and other multinational
companies have decided that the Chinese market and doing business in China
is essential to their future business strategy.' 5 China's perspective on the rule
of law, therefore, has enormous practical importance to foreign investors and
their governments.
II. PERENNIAL HISTORICAL DEBATE
Chinese skepticism of the rule of law has deep roots in Chinese Social
and political theory. Instability and changes in political power particularly
create opportunities for the Chinese to consider how and whether to reframe
the government and the social order. 6
A. Legalists v. Confucians
This perennial issue has traditionally been framed as a long-standing
debate between two fundamentally different approaches.' 7 The first is the
Legalist approach traditionally termed fazhi (more recently termed
yifazhiquo) l-what the West would label as the rule of law. The second is a
13Russia, for instance, is both a developing country and one with a
socialist/communist history. Others have noted Russia's evolving perceptions regarding
the rule of law. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, Rule of Law and Law-Based State, in
TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA? 204 (Donald Barry ed., 1992); Martin Buzak, The
Khodorkovsky Affair: Russia's Cultural Outlook Toward the Oligarchs and the Rule of
Law, 4-5 (Dec. 5, 2003) (unpublished student paper, on file with author).
14 Cao, supra note 1, at 539-40.
:5 See id. at 540.
16 Legal historians, for example, have studied the dialectic evolution of Chinese
laws. See generally CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND
PERSPECTIVES (Jerome Alan Cohen ed., 1970); JEROME ALAN COHEN, THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1968); GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE
SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAw (1996); GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, TRADITIONAL
CmNESE PENAL LAW (1990).
17 Compare Turner, supra note 6, at 3-19, and Jonathan K. Ocko, Using the Past to
Make a Case for the Rule of Law, in TURNER, supra note 1, at 65-87, with Jack L. Dull,
Epilogue: The Deep Roots of Resistance to Law Codes and Lawyers in China, in
TURNER, supra note 1, at 325-30. See also Urs Martin Lauchli, Cross-Cultural
Negotiations, With a Special Focus on ADR with the Chinese, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1045, 1058-64 (2000).
.Is Stephenson, supra note 5, at 76. Some Chinese prefer the term yifazhiguo,
meaning "a country ruled according to law" or "rule by law." Id. By crafting a new term,
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Confucian approach-what the West has sometimes labeled as a rule of man
but is more accurately translated as the rule of people from the Chinese word
renzhi.'9
The first recorded debate between the Legalists and Confucians is the
story of Zi Chan, dating from 536 B.C.20 Zi Chan, the prime minister of the
state of Zheng, ordered that criminal laws be inscribed and prominently
displayed. He intended this as "a dramatic gesture to demonstrate the
permanence of the law and to assure the people that the law would be applied
strictly according to its letter, free of government manipulation."'" This
dramatic and public gesture, however, provoked social and political
controversy over whether this Legalist approach to government was
appropriate.22
This debate, first occurring over two thousand years ago and repeated
many times over in China, emphasizes the following arguments and
counterarguments: The Legalists refer to the laws as fa, defined as the
positivist and formal statutes and codes of the government. Legalists argue
that rulers should rely on these laws meticulously; rulers should not rely on
their intellect, intuition, or arbitrary preferences. Just as craftspeople rely on
their professional tools, such as their compass or their square, rulers should
rely on the measurements and solutions dictated by the laws. 23 By doing so,
governing would be easier and the results would be predictable and uniform.
Order is achieved by these predetermined rules and external systems.
The Confucians, on the other hand, argue that the rulers' paramount
guides should be social and cultural norms.24 These rules of proper conduct,
called li, should be the basis for governing: "Li is the vehicle of
government.... When li is dishonored, government is lost. '25 Thus, if there
is a conflict, fa would have the lowest priority and li, as the moral standard,
the Chinese have more freedom in the interpretation of the concept rather than being
constrained by the more traditional term fazhi (fa defined as "law") which may have
historical associations with the West. Id. See also Yuanyuan Shen, Conceptions and
Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law Reform in Modem China,
in TURNER, supra note 1, at 20, 24-25 (discussing the political nuances of this
terminology).
19 Wejen Chang, Foreword to TURNER, supra note 1, at vii (translating ren as
"man").
20 Id.; Dull, supra note 17, at 328.
21 Chang, supra note 19, at vii.
22 id.
23 Id. at viii.
24 See CHEN JIANPAN, CONFUCIUS AS A TEACHER 266-71 (1990) [hereinafter CHEN];
see generally Qu CHuNLI, THE LIFE OF CONFUCIUS (1996).
25 CHEN, supra note 24, at 270 (quoting from Confucian teachings).
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would have the highest priority. These cultural norms and moral imperatives
have ancient roots and so would be the most widely accepted and
authoritative. 26 Furthermore, rulers exercising their discretion in the interests
of the community are far more important than protecting the interests of any
individual's needs. Rulers also can reinforce a long-standing system of
hierarchical relationships between individuals, thus furthering the order and
harmony achieved through a socially understood balance between internal
forces and these relationships.
That the ruler order and the subject obey, the father be kind and the son
dutiful, the elder brother loving and the younger respectful, the husband be
harmonious and the wife gentle, the mother-in-law be kind and the
daughter-in-law obedient; these are things in Li. That the ruler in ordering
order nothing against the right, and the subject obey with[out] any duplicity;
that the father be kind and at the same time be able to teach, and the son be
filial and at the same time be able to learn; the elder brother, while loving,
be friendly, and the young docile, while respectful; that the husband be
righteous, while harmonious, and the wife correct, while gentle; that the
mother-in-law be condescending, while kind, and the daughter-in-law be
winning, while obedient; these are excellent things in Li.27
Confucians further posit that fa is flawed in fundamental ways.28 Laws
are inevitably incomplete and rigid. They must be constantly reviewed and
analyzed. The uniformity that is valued by the Legalists is not important; in
fact, uniformity can be viewed as unworthy since a particularistic approach
that is tailored to unique circumstances better serves societal needs. A strict
rule of law also is evidence that rulers cannot rule effectively by utilizing
moral norms. Hence, laws are analogous to an external and physical force.
Deference to the laws indicates that the rulers are weak in political power and
the people are weak in character. As described by Confucius:
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by
punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of
shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by
Li, they will have the sense of shame and moreover will become good.29
26 Id. at 266-75.
7/ d. at 268-69.
28 Id. at 271.
29Id. at 271. See also Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons, and U.S. Intellectual
Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, in THE
CONFLICT & CULTURE READER 261, 263 (Pat K. Chew ed., 2001) [hereinafter CHEw].
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Legalists counter these Confucian positions with a practical concern:
How do you restrain the abuses of rulers whose main intent is maximizing
their own political power? After all, Legalists note, rulers have "100 battles a
day" in which decisions must be made and rulers' political indiscretion could
lead to improprieties.3 0 Confucians recognize this paramount challenge,
acknowledging that there is a risk of fallible humans wanting to gain
unlimited power. Confucians, however, propose that moral education and
indoctrination of rulers and people are the correct paths. Strengthening
internal character is the answer; resorting to formal laws when faced with
complex and important questions is inappropriate. 3'
B. Other Strands Supporting Skepticism
1. Chinese Experiences of the "Rule of Law"
The debate between the rule of law and the rule of people is fueled by
more than theoretical discussions of the relative merits and risks of each
approach. Chinese history is studded with experiments with the legalistic
approach that left distaste for a rule of law. The legalistic approach of the
Qing dynasty (1644-1911), for instance, had many harsh aspects.3 2 Under the
penal codes, the most serious crimes, called the "great evils," were
punishable by extreme forms of execution. 3 These great evils included
politically egregious activities such as treason, rebellion, and insurrection and
therefore may have merited such extreme punishments. However, they also
included activities that were less egregious, such as disloyalty, lack of filial
piety, or great lack of respect that would not appear commensurate with such
harsh punishments. In addition, under the principle of collective
responsibility, the criminal's family also was subject to punishment by exile,
enslavement, or castration. Rulers during the Qing Imperial period also used
30 Chang, supra note 19, at x.
3 Id. at ix.
32 See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 123-28 (2d ed.
1999); Joanna Waley-Cohen, Collective Responsibility in Qing Criminal Law, in
TURNER, supra note 1, at 112-31; R. Kent Guy, Rule of Man and the Rule of Law in
China: Punishing Provincial Governors During the Qing, in TURNER, supra note 1, at
88-111.
33 The most severe punishment was "slow slicing with exposure of the severed
head," followed by decapitation. Waley-Cohen, supra note 32, at 118-19.
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the laws as institutionally sanctioned tools for coercing their subjects to
succumb to their political control and to remove their political enemies. 34
Chinese historians also cite foreign powers' use of "rules of law" to
legitimize the exploitation of a weak imperial government during the 1800s
and early 1900s. In 1840, Emperor Dao Guang attempted to rid China of
Britain's opium trade and the societal problems that it created with a ban on'
the trade. British traders promoted the sale and use of opium in China
because the opium could be used in exchange for desirable Chinese teas and
silks. In response to the imperial ban, the British initiated the Opium Wars
against China. After losing the War, the Chinese were forced to sign the
Treaty of Nanking, which "legally" ceded Hong Kong'to Great Britain and
forced the opening of Chinese ports to foreign powers for the next 100 years.
The Treaty of Nanking was only the first of a series of "unequal treaties"
36between China and other Western powers. As described by Bai Shouyi:
Before the war, China had been an independent feudal country with the
Qing court exercising full sovereign rights without outside interference.
After the Qing rulers submitted to the British on August 29, 1842 by
signing the unequal Treaty of Nanking, China turned step by step into a
semi-colonial and semi-feudal country dominated-with the help of the
Qing regime-by foreign power.37
2. Questioning Western Experiences with the "Rule of Law"
The Chinese also have observed the West's own experience with the rule
of law. The Chinese question whether the rule of law has been an effective
tool for political stability, economic development, and the protection of
human and civil rights. The Chinese (and Western scholars) can point to
tragic historical examples of Western countries with formalized legal systems
that did not prevent or even sanction what was essentially genocide and
massive human rights violations.
38
34 See, e.g., id.; Guy, supra note 32, at 88 (describing the disciplining of Chinese
provincial governors and how this process served the political needs and illustrated the
absolute power of the emperor).3 5 JONATHAN SPENCE & ANNPING CHIN, THE CHINESE CENTURY: A PHOTOGRAPHIC
HISTORY 129, 158-59 (1996); YANG ZHAO Er AL., AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF CHINA
[ZHONGGUO TONGSHI GANGYAO] 431-48 (Bai Shouyi ed., 1982) [hereinafter BAI].
36 BAi, supra note 35, at 435-36.
37 Id. at 431.
38 See Brooks, supra note 2, at 2306-11.
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Vivian Curran, for instance, argues that reliance on law and legal theory
to prevent human rights violations is overrated and dangerous.39 She explores
how judiciaries in many nations have used the laws to enable governments to
violate their citizens' civil rights.40 Professor Curran offers a specific
example from Nazi Germany where the judiciary used their interpretive
discretion to essentially legitimize discrimination and persecution.
The first article of German Civil Code defined the human being as
acquiring basic legal capacity ("Rechtsfdhigkeit") by virtue of having been
born. Hitler had not repealed the Civil Code, so Nazi legal scholars showed
judges a way to deprive Jews of their Article I legal capacity despite the
Civil Code's continued legal effectiveness. They did this by analogizing
Jews to the dead, reasoning that all laws had to be read in accordance with
the guiding spirit of the nation's law (Recht); namely, the racial principles
of blood and race. Accordingly, only members of the allegedly racially pure
German Volk were deemed to be living for purposes of qualifying for legal
benefits. As Hitler already had decreed that Jews were barred irremediably
by reason of race and blood from belonging to the German Volk, the
scholars reasoned that by analogy Jews should be deemed disqualified from
a legal capacity conveyed by virtue of birth.4'
Thus, she concludes, it is the "values of the individual and institutional
actors that will determine whether law is a force for or against humanity at
any given moment in history. 42
C. Prevailing Approach
For most of Chinese history, the question appears to be who has won this
perennial debate between the rule of law and the rule of people. The clear
tendency has been for a preference towards the rule of people. Chinese
society and government have opted repeatedly for moral guidance and
cultural norms to trump over the rigidity of formal laws.43
39 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Racism's Past and Law's Future, 8 VT. L. REv. 683
(2004).
40 As she describes: "Law's performance generally has been dismal: the judiciaries
of nation after nation throughout time have enabled governments to discriminate against,
persecute, and even massacre portions of populations." Id. at 685.
4' Id. at 710.
42 Id. at 687.
43 See Guy, supra note 32, at 106-07.
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After the Communist Revolution, for instance, the Chinese government
advocated a socialist and communist political philosophy. 44 Particularly since
the 1978 reform movements, the government has emphasized economic
development while adhering to socialist political ideology.45 In implementing
these economic and political agendas, it has persistently exercised
considerable discretion regarding government laws and policies.46 In doing
so, it often defers to cultural and social norms over literal and technical
interpretations of more formal government regulations. The Chinese
government also has consistently demonstrated that political goals that
facilitate communitarian Communist principles take primacy over the legal
protection of individuals.47
mll. CONTEMPORARY ANGST
Chinese skepticism of the rule of law and China's struggle between the
rule of law and the rule of people continues today.48 This Article focuses on
two illustrative situations. One of these situations, intellectual property
protection, is of high interest to foreign investors and international
businesspeople. The second situation also contrasts the rule of law and the
rule of people, but does so in the context of domestic land use disputes. For
each situation, note how conflicts would be dealt with under a strict
interpretation of the rule of law, and then compare that approach with the
reality of cultural norms under the rule of the people.
A. Intellectual Property Protections
China welcomes and needs foreign investment, but it has always clearly
communicated its preferred terms for accepting foreign investment. 49 Among
44 STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 174
(1999).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., id. at 178-79 (stating that ownership, in China is a severable right and
Chinese law does not address specific rights and duties under the law).
48 For discussions on China's evolving current legal system, see, e.g., LUBMAN,
supra note 45; DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA: IN A NUTSHELL 61-66 (2003); Michael E. Burke IV et al., China Law, 36 INT'L L.
815, 815-16 (2002); LAW-MAKING IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 52-53 (Jan
Michiel Otto et al. eds., 2000).
49 For general discussions of direct foreign investments in China, see, e.g., BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS WITH CHINA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA §§ 1.01-5.04 (Parvis Saney &
Hans Smit eds., 1983) [hereinafter BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS]; and DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A
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its key priorities are maintaining government and Chinese Communist Party
control over foreign investment, foreign companies ultimately transferring
management and other operations to local control, and foreign companies
transferring technology and know-how to the foreign investment enterprise
such as a Sino-foreign joint venture. 0
Given Chinese pressure for foreign investors to transfer and share their
proprietary knowledge, foreign investors have been understandably
concerned that Chinese laws provide inadequate protection against piracy
and counterfeiting. Responding in part to these international demands, the
Chinese government has passed numerous laws prohibiting the disclosure of
proprietary information.5' In addition, there is a range of multilateral and
bilateral treaties, which include some form of intellectual property
52protection. While there are still some gaps in the regulatory framework,
there is an emerging, voluminous system of intellectual property-related
laws. At least on its face, these laws appear to address many of the major
concerns of foreign investors.
In practice, however, there is widespread disclosure of the proprietary
information of foreign investors.53 To foreign investors' chagrin, the People's
Republic of China (P.R.C.) appears to be the center of the world's most
serious counterfeiting and commercial piracy problems.54 Not only are these
PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN CHINA 98-113 (2002).
50 Jerome Alan Cohen, Negotiating Complex Contracts with China, in BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 49, § 2.02, at 2-9 to 2-12.
5' Professor Yu describes how the U.S.'s bullying of China with a series of economic
threats, trade wars, non-renewal of Most Favored Nation status, and opposition to
China's entry into the WTO eventually led to China's signing of intellectual property
agreements in 1992, 1995, and 1996. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting
Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 133
(2000). He suggests, however, that these bullying tactics may have been misguided
because it set up an ineffective bilateral policy of badgering, bickering and posturing. Id.
at 133-37. See also DELI YANG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA (2003); LEGAL RULES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN ASIA (Christopher Heath &
Kung-Chung Liu eds., 2002); Feinerman, in TURNER, supra note 9, at 304.
52 Yu, supra note 51, at 256.
53 See, e.g., Yu, supra note 51, at 133. See also CHOW, supra note 49, at 5-9; Anna
M. Han, Technology Licensing to China: The Influence of Culture, 19 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 629, 635-36 (1996); Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership
of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 351-52
(1993-94); Brent T. Yonehara, Comment, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession,
Film Piracy and Prospects for the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 12 J. ART & ENT. L.
63, 66-68 (2002); Brooks, supra note 2, at 2302.
54 See generally Yonehara, supra note 53, at 66-68.
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problems occurring in China, but China apparently is also the seedbed of
much global piracy.55
The New Balance story illustrates the unpredictability and risks of
investment in China.56 This Boston athletic shoe company has been moving
its production to China since the early 1990s.5 7 Today, between 60 and 70%
of its global output is manufactured there. 8 New Balance also wanted to tap
the China consumer market.59 In 1995, it selected Mr. Horace Chang, a
long-time Taiwanese supplier, to be its official sales partner and distributor
in China.6 ° Chang immersed himself in the China market.61 To boost sales, he
persuaded New Balance to promote its lower-priced "classic" model.
62
Shortly after, the classic shoes began showing up in Chinese stores for as
little as $20, even though the shoe ordinarily retailed for about $60.63 In
2000, New Balance executives asked Chang to alter his strategy because they
thought it could harm the company's image as a high-end technologically
advanced shoemaker. 64 Chang was puzzled and offended that the company
did not applaud his sales success and ambition.65 He continued to follow his
strategy, and subsequently, discounted shoes from Chang started showing up
in Japan and other Asian countries.66
Enraged, New Balance terminated Chang's distribution agreement, and
presumably stopped any further authorized manufacturing or distribution of
New Balance shoes.67 Chang did not understand why he was being punished
when he had quadrupled sales in China." Subsequently, and to New
Balance's dismay, Chang's discounted shoes then started showing up in
Europe, Australia, and Taiwan.69
55 See, e.g., id. at 78-83.
56 See Gabriel Kahn, Factory Fight: A Sneaker Maker Says China Partner Became
its Rival-New Balance, Other Brands Claim Suppliers Flood Market with Extra
Goods-Setback From a Local Judge, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at A1, A8.
57 id.
58 Id.
59 Id.60Id.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 Id.
64 1d.
65 Id.
66 id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 d.
[Vol. 20:1 20051
CHINA'S SKEPTICISM
New Balance turned to the Chinese legal system and China's intellectual
property enforcement agency, the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce (AIC). 70 It filed suit against Chang's companies. 7' The company
was heartened by the AIC's acknowledgment that Chang was violating
Chinese intellectual property laws and the Chinese court's agreement to hold
the evidence including the unsold shoes until the trial's outcome.72 The
judge, however, ultimately decided against New Balance.73 It concluded that
the original distribution agreement permitted Chang to make and sell the
shoes until 2003; the court did not recognize New Balance's termination of
the agreement.74
The New Balance lawyer said the company was "naive" about the China
environment and in its relationship with Chang.75 The company claims that it
spent millions of dollars in legal fees, that its sales and brand image had been
damaged by its former licensee, and that Chang continued to use New
Balance know-how and technology to manufacture and distribute its shoes
even though he was not authorized to do S0.76 Furthermore, its strategy to
become the number two U.S. shoe manufacturer in China, after Nike, had
been notably stalled.77
What explains the disparity between technical legal rules (the rule of
law) and what actually happens in practice (the rule of people)? While the
answer is complex, it appears that cultural and political factors play a
significant role. Recalling the American approach to intellectual property
helps put the Chinese approach in context. U.S. intellectual property laws are
premised on certain assumptions about what motivates individuals to be
creative and entrepreneurial. 8 Our belief is that individuals are more likely to
invent if they are rewarded with an exclusive right to the use of the
invention.79 Others then pay the inventor for the privilege of using the
invention through some royalty arrangement, thus providing the creator with
a monetary reward.80 This individual right of exclusivity and the resulting
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 id.
77 Id.
78 JANICE MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 18, 23-26 (2003)
(describing these premises in the context of U.S. patent laws).
79 id.
80 Id.
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rewards presumably motivates individuals, prompted by their self-interest, to
81
engage in innovative activities.
In contrast to this American perspective, traditional Chinese culture
emphasizes the collective societal interest.82  Individual rights are
minimized. 3 The emphasis instead is on creating benefits and minimizing
harms to the family and the community.84 Chinese cultural norms are
contrary to ,notions of exclusivity.85 A socialist philosophy and state-control
led economy also conveniently reinforces this notion of the "greater good." 86
In addition, China has a culture of copying and sharing created works.8 7
Traditionally, the creator does not have the right to own or monopolize her or
his work.88 Authors and artists, much esteemed in Chinese society, want their
work to be copied.89 The highest form of flattery was to admire the writings,
art, or other creative work so much that one would want to imitate and
recreate it.90 This "borrowing" of the work was viewed as a great tribute.91
Once again, socialist philosophy is consistent with the concept of sharing
one's work for societal benefits.
American investors who have negotiated what they consider adequate
intellectual property protections in joint venture agreements have often been
frustrated by the relative ineffectiveness of the contract terms.92 Again,
cultural factors play a role. The contract may prohibit employees of the
Chinese joint-venture partner from disclosing the American partner's
proprietary information to 'third parties.' The Chinese, however, may define
a 'third party' differently than American business practices. In China's
collectivist, socialist, relationship-oriented society, the notion of outsider
status may be quite narrow. For instance, cultural traditions would likely
indicate that family members, 'extended-family' members, close friends,
81 Id.
82 See WILLIAM ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 10 (1995).
83 Id. at 10-12.
84Id. at 11-12.
85 See id. at 12.
86 See id.; Yonehara, supra note 53, at 74-75.
87 Yonehara, supra note 53, at 74-78; see generally ALFORD, supra note 82.88 See Yonehara, supra note 53, at 76.
'
9 Id. at 78-79.
9Ild. at 79.
9' See id. at 78-79.
92 See R. Randle Edwards, The Future of U.S.-China Trade and Investment-The
Legal and Economic Climate, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 49, § 1.04, at 1-
10.
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party members, and state-affiliated companies and their representatives are
not outsiders, and hence, would not be considered as 'third parties.'
B. Land Use Disputes
Chinese sociologist Zhang Jing also illustrates the prevalence of cultural
norms over legal values with her fascinating study of current land use
disputes in China.93 After analyzing numerous conflicts between farmers or
between farmers and the government in various Chinese provinces, Professor
Zhang proposes two possible approaches for resolving their disputes: the
"interest politics" model and the "legal equilibrium" model.
94 Her interest
politics model, as summarized below, appears to be another expression of
what I have described above as the rule of people, while the legal equilibrium
model is analogous to the rule of law. 95 Consistent with our thesis, Zhang
also posits that the interest politics model better predicts the outcome of
domestic land use disputes than the legal equilibrium model.
96
The Interest Politics Model has the following characteristics
97:
1. Rules are endlessly negotiated. Rules are created and change
continuously through a process of agreement and acquiescence.
2. Parties determine what is legitimate and who will be influential
in resolving the dispute.
3. The rules have mass appeal because they are influenced by the
ideas of the majority.
4. Individuals who have access to information are powerful because
they are in a position to interpret events and shape decisions.
In contrast, the Legal Equilibrium Model has the attributes listedbelow"S:
1. Basic negotiation principles are externally determined as part of
the political and legislative process. The parties cannot
93 Zhang Jing, The Uncertainty of Land Use Rules: An Interpretive Framework,
Presentation at the University of Pittsburgh Department of Political Science Lecture
(2004) and at the International Symposium on Law and Society 1, 9 (Oct. 11-12, 2002)
(unpublished paper, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author) [hereinafter Zhang].
See also Phyllis L. Chang, Deciding Disputes: Factors that Guide Chinese Courts in the
Adjudication of Rural Responsibility Contract Disputes, in CONTRACT, GuANZI, AND
DIsPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 129-30 (Tahirih V. Lee ed., 1997).
94 Zhang, supra note 93, at 8-10.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 9.
97 ld. at 10.
98 Id.
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arbitrarily change these principles. Furthermore, these principles
are mandatory and subject to legal enforcement.
2. Those administering the dispute resolution process have little
latitude in defining their roles or making decisions. Their role is
merely to communicate and apply the set rules. The parties'
positions are judged according to legal principles, not according
to the parties' power.
3. Rules are established and are relatively stable. They must be
interpreted by "specialist legal authorities" and are not subject to
arbitrary alterations or the non-legal interests of the parties.
In explaining how the interest politics model actually operates in land
use disputes, 99 Zhang describes how different forces vie for power and
control, each trying to satisfy their interests.'1°° In particular, she identifies
four important interactive forces: 1) state regulators and state policies, 2)
local cadre, 3) peasants acting collectively, and 4) the agreements between
the parties including a sense of justice in the agreements' interpretation.' °'
The dispute resolution process used in the interest politics model is not
intended to. be rational, law-based, or efficiency-oriented; rather, the process
is characterized as a competitive struggle between forces which are malleable
enough to accommodate their interests.0 2 In any given dispute, the interests
may be satisfied differently, depending on which groups prove to be the most
powerful or influential. 03 The way one dispute is resolved is not necessarily
predictive of how others will be resolved." Each dispute has its own interest
politics depending on the issues and the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the different forces. 0 5
In one case, for example, the state issued a new policy of land
redistribution in a county where the main source of residents' income came
from farming chestnut trees. 1 6 The cadres and the households in each village
also had negotiated contracts.'0 7 In some of the villages in the country, the
99 Disputes studied include those dealing with sand management in Inner Mongolia,
distribution of orchard lands in Hebei province, commercial land acquisition in Zhejiang
province, and the reclamation of land by peasants in Hebei province. Zhang, supra note
93, at 4-6.
'0°Id. at4.
101 Id. at 4-6.
'1 Id. at 9.
'03 Id. at 8.
'04Id. at 9.
105 Id.
'6 Id. at 5.
107 Id.
[Vol. 20:1 20051
CH1NA'S SKEPTICISM
farmers complied with the new policy in full. 08 Other villages "fine-tuned"
the policy.'" For example, in one village the cadres of the county
commission on laws, noting the community controversy over the new policy,
called a meeting of the Communist Party members and representatives of
each household." 0 The group could not come to a "unified conclusion.""'
The cadres then asked each household to send a representative to vote.
112
Eighty-five percent voted against the redistribution of the land, and
consequently, the cadres decided not to proceed with the new policy. 3
Zhang further explains:
Though the decision-making power of grass-roots cadres is critical, it has to
be adapted to the level of support .... When there is tremendous public
will, the collective will may change the decisions of either the state or the
village cadres. The pressure of the collective will may also influence
agreements by parties concerned. If it is generally accepted by villagers, the
individual contract may proceed; if not, it has to be changed.... The
implementation of rules... largely depends on whether they are acquiesced
to by those involved."1
4
The legal equilibrium model is not used because the people do not view
it as legitimate or relevant to their disputes.' '5 The ordinary person is not
involved in and does not believe there is a way for them to have meaningful
input into legislation.' 6 Rather, law-making is done by an elite group of
politicians.!1 7 In addition, property laws are viewed as flawed." 8 They are
perceived as unclear and insufficient, so people do not recognize legal
documents and rules and do not consider them credible' 19
108 Id.
109 Id.
"
0 Id. at 7.
"'1 Id.
112 Id.at 7.
113Id.
"4 Id. at 8.
115 Id.
116Id.
117 i]d.
118 Id.
"9 Id.at 8.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
Given Chinese skepticism of the rule of law and the disparity in practice
between the rule of law and the rule of people, what conclusory observations
can we make?
A. "Laws" and the Reality of Law
Since the Chinese Communist Party began introducing economic reforms
and attracting direct foreign investment in 1978, the West has carefully
followed the emerging legal regulatory structure. 20 American politicians,
businesspeople, and academics have repeatedly questioned whether there
were sufficient laws on the subjects most important to them.' 2' China has
responded with literally hundreds of laws. 122 While not necessarily as
comprehensive as Western investors would like, the volumes of statutes and
regulations certainly represent a significant legislative effort. 23
As we have explored above, however, a discrepancy between what a
literal reading of the laws might indicate and the effective meaning of the
laws exists. Given the continued pervasiveness of the rule of people and
complementary governmental and judicial discretion, it is not always clear
which laws will be recognized and enforced and how laws will be
interpreted. Thus, while China can now point to an elaborate legal
framework, there continues to be a disconnection between the formal laws
and the oftentimes reality of legal opaqueness.
B. Parallel Systems
As our discussion substantiates, both a rule of law and a rule of people
exist in China today. While Chinese intellectual property laws provide for
protection of intellectual property, the pervasive disclosure of propriety
information continues. While a legal regime provides principles for resolving
conflict in land use, interests created by cultural, social, and economic factors
dictate more predictably the outcome of land use disputes. Both the rule of
law and the rule of people are operating in parallel in a transitioning and
sometimes uneasy relationship. As pragmatists, Western investors and
foreign policy strategists should be aware of and informed about these
parallel systems. Furthermore, cultural anthropologists suggest that we
120 See Cohen, supra note 50, § 2.02, at 2-9 to 2-12.
121 Edwards, supra note 92,.§ 1.04, at 1-10.
122 Feinerman, supra note 9, at 309.
123 Cohen, supra note 50, § 2.02, at 2-9 to 2-12.
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suspend our own cultural approach and biases and instead attempt to
understand this Chinese approach as the norm. 24 Rather than holding the
U.S. approach as the familiar standard by which we evaluate the Chinese
system, we should try to evaluate the Chinese system by more objective
standards or from Chinese standards.
Margaret Woo, for instance, explores how fazhi and renzhi play out in
judicial decision-making in China. 25 Noting that judicial discretion is an
integral part of the Chinese legal system, Professor Woo explains three types
of discretion evident today. 126 First, there is "fact-based" discretion, which
allows judges to consider the specific facts of the case and tailor a result that
is reasonable and appropriate for these particular parties and their
circumstances. 27 This discretion takes priority over rigid adherence to legal
technicalities. 128 Second, there is "self-interested" discretion, where judges
resolve disputes in ways that serve their own economic or relational
interests.129 This form of discretion, sometimes associated with guanxi an
(cases resolved through personal relations) and renqing an (cases resolved by
"doing a favor") introduces the possibility of judicial corruption.13 Finally,
there is "ideological discretion" where judges interpret legal principles in
ways that are consistent with political ideology. 3 The 1982 Chinese
Constitution supports this type of judicial discretion by providing that all
legal work be guided by the four fundamental principles: "adherence to the
socialist order, to the people's democratic dictatorship, to the leadership of
the Communist Party, to Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought."' 3 2 All
three types of discretion are opportunities for the rule of people to influence
judicial-legal outcomes. 33
'24 See, e.g., Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural
Settings: Problems and Prospects, in CHEW, supra note 29, at 8-14; John Paul Lederach,
Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, in CHEw, supra note 29,
at 18-22.
125 Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in
TURNER, supra note 1, at 163, 165-72.
126 Id. at 166.
117 Id. at 167.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 169.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 170.
132 Id. (quoting XJANFA [Constitution] preamble (1982)).
133 See id. at 167.
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C. Many Forms of the Rule of Law
As the Chinese have recognized, the "rule of law" is only an abstraction
that is neither necessarily bad nor necessarily good; neither necessarily
immoral nor necessarily moral.' 34 As Chinese philosopher Xunxi admonished
the effect of a rule of law, it depends in part on the individuals who are in
position to enforce and interpret it:
Laws cannot stand alone... for when they are implemented by the right
person they survive, but if neglected they disappear .... Law is essential
for order, but the superior [person] is the source of law. So when there is a
superior [person], even incomplete laws can extend eveiywhere. But when
there is no [superior] person, even comprehensive laws cannot apply to all
situations or be flexible enough to respond to change. 35
The effect of the rule of law also depends on its substantive terms and its
policy objectives. 36 While an ethnocentric West may assume that every rule
of law necessarily provides for the same civil rights and economic ideologies
that underlie the legal framework of Western countries, that assumption is
myopic. Instead, there are innumerable forms of the rule of law, each of
which reflects the politics, economy, religions, and cultures of the individuals
and institutions that created and control the legal regime. In a country like
China, where the legal infrastructure is still emerging, the rule of law may
more accurately represent aspirational rather than currently viable legal
principles. It also may represent a transitional set of statutes and rules, which
will evolve as the country's economic, political, and societal systems mature.
For now, as Professor Woo explains, judges and politicians may interpret
the rule of law in ways that facilitate the P.R.C.'s current political and
economic agenda. 37 In addition, China has consistently drafted and
interpreted laws in ways that maximize the government's control and assures
that it will have substantial flexibility in using the laws as tools to satisfy its
needs.
138
As Randall Peerenboom suggests, China faces the threshold question of
whether to have a rule of law, and presuming so, the critical challenge is
'3 Guy, supra note 32, at 88.
3' Turner, supra note 6, at 3 (quoting Xunzi, d. ca. 210 B.C.).136 Guy, supra note 32, at 88; Woo, supra note 125, at 170-71, 75-77.
37 Woo, supra note 125, at 170-71.
138 See id.; see also Guy, supra note 32, at 88-89.
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selecting a model for its rule of law.' 39 He contrasts the Western conception
of the rule of law with that envisioned by Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The
Western model is labeled the "liberal democratic version of [the] rule of
law."
140
[This model] incorporates free market capitalism (subject to qualifications
that would allow various degrees of "legitimate" government regulation of
the market), multiparty democracy in which citizens may choose their
representatives at all levels of government, and a liberal interpretation of
human rights that gives priority to civil and political rights over economic,
social, cultural, and collective or group rights.'
41
According to Professor Peerenboom, Jiang Zemin and other central
leaders, on the other hand, propose a "[sitate-centered socialist rule of
law."'
142
[This model endorses] a [s]tate-centered socialist rule of law defined by,
inter alia, a socialist form of economy (which in today's China means an
increasingly market-based economy but one in which public ownership still
plays a somewhat larger role than in other market economies); a non-
democratic system in which the (Chinese Communist) Party plays a leading
role; and an interpretation of rights that emphasizes stability, collective
rights over individual rights, and subsistence as the basic right rather than
civil and political rights.
41
While these two models offer the greatest contrast, hybrid models are
also a possibility.'4
139See Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred
Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 472-76,
486-509 (2002).
'40Id. at 472.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 475.
143 Id. at 475-76.
144 As Professor Peerenboom explains:
[T]here is some support for a democratic but non-liberal (New Confucian)
Communitarian variant built on market capitalism. This form favors a somewhat
greater degree of government intervention than in the liberal version; some genuine
form of multiparty democracy in which citizens choose their representatives at all
levels of government; plus a communitarian or collectivist interpretation of rights
that attaches relatively greater weight to the interests of the majority and collective
rights as opposed to the civil and political tights of individuals.
Another variant is a Neo-Authoritarian or Soft Authoritarian form of rule of
law that, like the Communitarian version, rejects a liberal interpretation of rights,
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V. CONCLUSION
The West is enamored with the concept of the rule of law and believes
that it is integral to nation-building. China has a different cultural
perspective; it is skeptical of the rule of law. For generations, China has
debated the merits and flaws of relying on formal laws versus adhering
instead to a rule of people as articulated by Confucian principles and cultural
norms. This debate continues today, as illustrated in how China deals with
intellectual property disputes and with land use disputes.
There is a range of implications of China's skepticism of a rule of law
and its inclinations toward a rule of people. This helps explain why the
existence of a formal law is not the same thing as the widespread recognition
or meaningful enforcement of that law. Conflicts in international transactions
or in purely domestic relationships are as likely, and often more likely, to be
resolved by the rule of people than by legal technicalities. This discussion
also points out that a rule of law is not monolithic. The West's model of the
rule may be substantively and ideologically distinguished from a Chinese
model of the rule of law.
As in other times in China's history, Chinese society is currently facing a
period of economic, social, political, and legal evolution. This Article
explores how China has historically debated and contemporaneously debates
the primacy of a rule of law (that relies on a legalistic approach) versus a rule
of people (that adheres to cultural norms and governmental discretion). It is
not clear how China will resolve its current debate. This Article concludes by
introducing various possibilities depicted in the matrix below. Introducing
this matrix hopefully facilitates thought, while not presuming the outcome.
but unlike its Communitarian cousin, also rejects democracy. Whereas
Communitarians adopt a -genuine multiparty democracy in which citizens choose
their representatives at all levels of government, Neo-Authoritarians permit
democracy only at lower levels of government or not at all.
Id. at 476.
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Matrix on Chinese Alternatives
A rule of people A rule of people
that values a rule of that rejects a rule of
law law
A rule of law that Alternative 4 Alternative 2
mirrors the rule of
people
A rule of law that Alternative 3 Alternative 1
rejects a rule of people
In Alternative 1, society rejects a legalistic approach. At the same time,
the legal system rejects cultural norms. Under this alternative, the rule of law
(advocating a legalistic approach) and the rule of people (giving primacy to
cultural norms) would predictably conflict. People would not recognize,
follow, or consider credible the rule of law, and the law would discount
societal values. As this article explains, in some ways, this describes the
current situation where there is a disconnect between a rule of law and a rule
of people.
In Alternative 2, society rejects a legalistic approach, even though the
legal system mirrors cultural norms. This alternative may describe a
transitional environment, when the legal system has incorporated societal
values, but society has not yet accepted a legalistic approach.
In Alternative 3, society values a legalistic approach, even though the
legal system does not take into account or even rejects cultural norms. This is
an unlikely alternative, given China's historical skepticism of the rule of law.
In Alternative 4, society values a legalistic approach, while the legal
system mirrors cultural norms. This would appear to be the most optimal
alternative for effective nation-building. A rule of law and a rule of people
would co-exist, but be in sync; both cultural norms and legal rules would
facilitate societal functioning. This alternative, however, is not premised on
any particular model of the rule of law or a rule of people. Thus, a Chinese
rule of law may be based on liberal democratic principles or instead on more
socialist ideology. Hence, as the West promotes the rule of law in China,
China's affirmative response to its urging may be different than the West
anticipates.
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